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Illegal Search and Seizure in Ohio
There has been much controversy over the constitutional pro-
tection against arbitrary police searches and seizures.1 Fear of the
invasion of domiciliary and personal integrity has resulted in agita-
tion for a more meaningful implementation of the constitutional
guaranty through universal adoption of the federal rule prohibiting
the use of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure in
criminal proceedings. Others have belittled this fear and opposed
adoption of the exclusionary rule, arguing that it affords undue
protection to the individual as against the community. The purpose
of this comment is to examine alternative protections against un-
reasonable searches and seizures with particular emphasis on the
Ohio situation, the various contentions of both groups, the ques-
tion of whether there is an actual need for adoption of the ex-
clusionary rule in Ohio and what the results of such adoption
would be.
Only brief notice need be taken of the development of the ex-
clusionary rule because of the overabundance of good legal com-
mentaries upon this history.2 The common law rule was that the
admissibility of evidence, otherwise competent, is not affected by
the illegality of the means by which it is procured.3 The federal
rule had its beginning in Boyd v. United States4 and although the
status of the rule was questionable after Adams v. New York,5
Weeks v. United States6 finally established the exception to the
common law rule in federal courts that evidence obtained by of-
ficial unreasonable search and seizure will not be admitted in evi-
dence with certain limitations.7 In 1951, the exclusionary rule was
1 This problem is closely related to similar difficulties presented by illegal
arrests and imprisonments, confessions secured by duress, the persecution of
minorities under color of law in some states and generally the whole problem
of police lawlessness. On the general problem, see Hall, Police and Law in a
Democratic Society, 28 IxD. L. J. 133 (1953); Hopnins, OuR LAwLrss PoTCs
(1931); Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 11 NAT. Comm. ow LAw OBsERvATEoN
AND ENFORCrEi- (1931).
2 Best discussions of federal cases may be found in: 45 ILL. L. PR-v. 1 (1950),
58 YALE L. J. 144 (1948), 33 IowA L. REv. 472 (1948), 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 359
(1941), 15 So. CA. L. PREV. 60 (1941), 42 MicH. L. lzv. 147 (1943), 47 Mrcn L.
RLT. 1137 (1949), and 50 COL. L. Rv. 364 (1950).
3 1 GREENLEAF, EviDuEsc § 254a (12th ed. 1896); 5 Joxrs, EvinENCE §2075n3
and § 2076n6 (2nd. ed. 1926); 8 WiGoioan, Ev)EcE § 2183 (3rd. ed. 1940).
4 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5 192 U.S. 585 (1904) affirming 176 N.Y. 351, 68 NME. 636, 63 LR.A 406
(1903).
6 232 US. 383 (1914).
7 Discussion of these limitations, infra.
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incorporated into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.,
Most state courts have not followed the federal rule9 This pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not read in-
to the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore admission of evidence
obtained by unreasonable search and seizure in a state court for
a state offense will not be reversed by a federal court10 nor will a
federal court enjoin the use of such evidence in a state court." The
reason for these holdings is because other remedies are deemed
sufficient even though the protection against unreasonable search
and seizure is regarded as a basic right. In Ohio, after a stormy
and somewhat indecisive period of years,' 2 State v. Lindway 3 at
last decided that all evidence is admissible even though it was ob-
tained by unreasonable search and seizure.
OTHER Rm iEmIs AN DETERRENTS.
Of primary consideration in determining whether the exclu-
sionary rule is essential to adequate protection of the constitutional
freedom from illegal searches and seizures is the question of
whether there are other sufficient remedies to the victim or deter-
rents to the police.
It is frequently urged that the victim has an adequate protec-
tion in the suit in tort for damages. There is no action against
judicial or quasi-judicial officers for mistakes made while honestly
exercising the functions of their office within their jurisdiction. 14 A
municipality is not liable in damages for injuries resulting from
torts of its police officers on the theory of respondeat superior I5 un-
8 FE. RULES Canx. PIoc. 41 (e), 18 U. S. C. (1951).
916 states have adopted the federal rule and 31 states have refused to
follow the federal rule. Appendix, Table I, Wolf v Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
10 Wolf v. Colorado, supra, note 9.
11 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
12 For complete discussion of the Ohio cases, see 3 OHIo ST. L. J. 73 (1936);
Rudd, Present Significance of Constitutional Guaranty Against Unreasonable
Search and Seizure, 18 Cni. L. Rzv. 387 (1949).
13 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E. 2d 255 (1936). Cases following State v. Lindway
have interpreted it to mean full rejection of the federal rule. Rudd, supra,
note 11, at 399.
14 Bender v. Addams, 28 Ohio App. 75, 162 N.E. 604 (1928) where respond-
eat superior was held not applicable against a prohibition commissioner when
inspector made an illegal search. See Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio 402 (1884).
Is 28 0. Jun. § 605; 18 McQuLn, MuiNcipAL CoPoATioNs § 53.69 (3rd
ed. 1950). Compare liability of the municipality for negligence of police in
traffic accidents, OHio GEN. CODE § 3714-1; Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio
St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922), overruling Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158,
126 N.E. 72, 9 A.L.R. 131 (1919). The federal government is not liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for illegal search and seizure made by federal
officer. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
1953]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
less there is ratification which is not easily established.16 The of-
ficer's illegal search is a trespass and makes him liable for at least
nominal damages.17 Thus the police officer is, in nearly all cases,
the only defendant who would be liable and then the damages are
usually nominal.' 8 Circumstances of reasonable belief that evidence
of crime is harbored within the house are admissible in evidence
in mitigation of damages.19 The biggest problem involved in the
tort action against the officer is the matter of collection. With the
exception of certain sheriffs and police captains in Chicago and
Miami mentioned in the Kefauver Report, police are not distin-
guished by their personal wealth. A police officer's salary is not
subject to garnishment or attachment 20 in most states, but is subject
to garnishment in Ohio. 2' Some jurisdictions require their officers
to be bonded, but it is frequently difficult to obtain a judgment
against the bonding company when there is an illegal act by the
officer.22 Even if the judgment is paid by the officer, the deterrent
effect may be slight since the officer is frequently defended without
cost.23 The municipal corporation has the power to reimburse the
officer when he incurs a loss in discharge of his official duty.24
A further possibility is a criminal action against the offending
officer, but this is a rare occurence. It is hard to imagine a prose-
cuting attorney instituting such an action against his own officer.
Defendants in such cases are rarely convicted.25
Disciplinary action by the police department itself could be
an effective deterrent, but in absence of some drastic result of the
illegal search and seizure such as possible loss of the conviction,
16 Mere authorization of attorney to defend the officer is not ratification
by the municipality. Savage v. District of Columbia, 52 A.2d 120 (D.C. Muni.
App. 1947).
17 Dougherty v. Gilbert, Tappan 38 (1816); State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St.
166, 172, 2 N.E.2d 255, 258 (1936). OHio GE. CODE § 6212-27 codified this rule,
but even though it was repealed in 1933, the rule still remains.
1 8 In Dougherty v. Gilbert, supra note 17, a verdict for 10 cents was given,
but in Bender v. Addams, supra note 14, the jury returned a verdict for $25,000.
19 Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 509 (1844).
20 17 McQmuxLN, supra note 15, § 49.86.
2 1 Omo GEN. CODE § 11760. See Uricich v. Kolesar, 132 Ohio St. 115,
5 N.E. 2d 335 (1937) affirming 7 N.E. 2nd 413, 54 Ohio App. 309 (1937).
22 Some jurisdictions hold the act colore officii when the officer commits
an illegal search and the bonding company is not liable. Hall, Law of Ar-
rest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 Cmic. L. Rsv. 345, 349-52
(1936). Officer and surety held liable for officer's assault and illegal search in
Almond v. Rubenstein, 25 Ohio N.P. N.S. 101 (1923). There is also some ques-
tion as to whether a private person is a beneficiary who can sue on the bond.
23 CoNsMXUS, SEARCH AND SmzuRE, 45 (2nd. ed. 1930).
24 6 McQuxriN, supra note 15, § 17.137.
2S For fuller discussion of the inadequacy of the criminal action against
the offending officer, see Rudd, supra note 12, at 389.
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this protective device also seems inadequate. In Columbus, from
1922 through 1941, there were only 192 cases of departmental dis-
cipline brought for misconduct of all types and mild penalties were
invoked in even the most flagrant cases.2 6
Of course an individual is privileged to resist the illegal search
and seizure, but the inadequacy of this possibility is clear. Most
people would rather permit the search than resist an officer of the
law even assuming they knew when a search was illegal and what
degree of force might be used. Failure to use physical resistance
does not constitute waiver or consent.27
Injunctive relief is another theoretical possibility,28 but the
search is over before an injunction to prevent the search can be
obtained. It is not a police custom to give advance notice of a raid.
An injunction by a state court to restrain use of evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure in another court is a further possibility.
Even if the maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution
is sidestepped, it would seem unlikely that an "admission" state
would allow such an injunction.
The victim of the illegal search may reacquire the articles
seized in restitution unless the articles are tainted with illegality,
such as bombs or narcotics, but restitution will not be granted un-
til the government has finished their use of the articles in evi-
dence.29
It has been suggested that officers violating instructions of
search warrants or attempting to introduce evidence illegally ob-
tained should be convicted of contempt of court. 30 There has been
little acceptance of this suggestion probably since it would deter
officers from the use of search warrants.31
The effect of public opinion cannot be ignored. It is clear that
an aroused public could bring substantial pressure to bear upon
elected officials and thus effectuate a reduction in the number of
illegal searches and seizures. Unfortunately, however, these events
rarely hit the public eye as invasions of the constitution. When the
victim is guilty or of a particularly unsavory character, the news-
26 CoLumius POLCE Snmy 1941-2, by Citizens Research, Inc., pp. 19-20
(mimeographed report in Ohio State Law Library). The study also indicated
that two-thirds of the force that had seen much service had never been dis-
ciplined and the writer indicated that this seemed too good to be true.
27 State v. Lindway, supra note 16; Bender v. Addams, supra note 13.
28 Public officers cannot be enjoined from performing their official duties
unless the act threatened by them would be without authority or in viola-
tion of law. Cincinnati v. Wegehoft, 119 Ohio St. 136, 162 N.E. 389 (1928).
29 Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegaily
Obtained Evidence, 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 60 (1941).
30 8 WGmom, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2184.
3158 YAL L. J. 144, at 162. This suggestion has been adopted in one state,
however. See MicH. STAT. AN., § 27.511 (1938), Com. LAws 1948, § 605.1
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paper emphasizes the end rather than the means used to secure the
conviction. When the victim is innocent, which is too frequently
the case, the police drop the matter and no publicity results unless
the victim happens to be influential.32
Thus, it appears that there is no really effective device avail-
able other than the exclusionary rule which would provide pro-
tection against police lawlessness. Practical unavailability of these
other remedies is a principal argument in favor of adoption of the
exclusionary rule.
CoNTrsoNs.
On first impression, the rule seems to be in perfect accord
with the search and seizure language of the state and national con-
stitutions.33 The exclusionary rule in federal courts formerly was
based on a fusion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 34 but now
the rule is considered by the U. S. Supreme Court to be solely a
result of the Fourth Amendment or a "McNabb" type rule.35 The
rule is not considered so basic as to be a part of due process of law.36
In spite of the appearance of accord with the constitution, the fed-
eral rule has had many critics.
The theoretical arguments for the "admissibility" group are
presented by the late Dean Wigmore. He said that the "judge
should not investigate and punish all of the offenses which inci-
dentally cross the path of the litigation."37 He argued that the pro-
cedural safeguard of pleading is lacking. In federal court, however,
a motion to suppress must be filed before trial,38 and an answer is
filed, so the issue-raising and notice giving functions of pleading
are satisfied by the pre-trial motion and answer. Confusion of the
jury is also mentioned as a disadvantage of the federal rule, but
this is impossible as the issue is determined before a jury is im-
paneled. The argument that the exclusionary rule distorts the rules
of evidence seems to have little weight. If the reason for this ob-
32 In Bender v. Addams, supra note 14, the victim happened to be a prom-
inent citizen and a state senator. Through an error, the search was made and
nothing was found. The substantial verdict in the case, supra note 18, is ex-
plainable on basis of the plaintiffs influential position and jury prejudice
against prohibition.
33 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. AmENs. IV; Omo CowsT. AnT. I, §
14.
34 See Corwin, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930).
3 5 See Grant, supra note 28, at 60.
3 6 Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 9.
37 8 WIGmiORE, op. cit. sUpTa note 3, § 2183.
38 Weeks v. United States, supra note 6.
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jection is that it is an exception to the general rule, 9 many other
rules of evidence, such as the hearsay exceptions, should be abol-
ished on the same principle. This latter argument, obviously, should
have little effect
Dean Wigmore characterizes the foundation of the federal rule
as "misguided sentimentality."40 One of the principal causes of the
American Revolution was the arbitrary use of the Writs of Assist-
ance which resulted in continued and outrageous violation of co-
lonial homes.41 The intention of the drafters of the Fourth Amend-
ment was to put such practices at an end. Can the results of this
American heritage be justifiably called "misguided sentimentality"?
The principal practical objection to the federal rule seems to
be that it allows criminals to go free when they would otherwise be
convicted. 42 Everyone would agree that this is not a desirable re-
sult, but does this result necessarily follow from an adoption of
this rule? In essence the rule is merely a requirement that a search
warrant be procured whenever practicable before a search is un-
dertaken. It is not difficult to obtain a search warrant in Ohio pro-
vided there is probable cause for belief that a violation of law
exists.4 3 Justice Douglas has said, in speaking of the purpose of
requiring a search warrant, that, "This is not done to shield crimi-
nals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It is
done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that
privacy in order to enforce the law. ' 44 Few critics argue that the
requirements for a search warrant should be abolished or liberal-
ized, but many apparently feel they should be complied with only
when the officer has the inclination. Thus the exclusionary rule has
resulted in a meaningful constitutional guaranty and yet has not
39 See statement of common law rule, supra.
40 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2184.
4 1 James Otis described the Writs of Assistance as "the worst instrument
of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the funda-
mental principles of law, that was ever found in an English law book" because
they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."
February 1761, Boston. Boyd v United States, supra note 4, 625.
42 Judge Cardoza said in People v Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 17; 150 N.E. 585,
588 (1926), "The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power, through
over-zeal or indiscretion, to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes
the most flagitious."
43 The affidavit is the preliminary step in obtaining a search warrant.
Oao GEaN. CODE § 13430-3 provides that the affidavit must particularly describe
the place to be searched and what is to be seized, the offense must be sub-
stantially alleged, and the facts must be set forth upon which such belief is
based. The affidavit is then taken to a judge or magistrate within the juris-
diction who will issue the warrant if he is satisfied there is probable cause.
OHio GErT. CODE §§ 13430-1 and 2. For more detailed treatment, see 36 0. Jum.
445 et seq; 3 Omo ST. L.J. 329 (1937).
44 McDonald v. United States 335 U.S. 451 (1947).
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allowed the criminal to escape. It is clear that in order to have any
degree of justice, the constitution must protect everyone-the guilty
as well as the innocent.
Proponents of the exclusionary rule advance protection of the
right of privacy and meaningful implementation of the constitu-
tional guarantee as positive reasons for the rule. Justice Rutledge
has said "The version of the Fourth Amendment today held ap-
plicable to the states hardly rises to the dignity of a form of words;
at best it is a pale and frayed carbon copy of the original. ..,45
Although the value of the protections provided for by constitution
should be above argument, there seems to be a need to justify these
protections. Judge Levine believes that "These constitutional safe-
guards are necessary not only because of the experience of past
ages, but also because of our nowdays recent experiences. The
abuse of this legal process called the search warrant has become so
frequent as to almost render the individual the prey of avarice and
of private gain. We must of course enforce the law, but such en-
forcement must be accomplished by legal means. Every person, no
matter how humble, is protected against trespass and invasion of
his private property. ' 46 Constitutional provisions should be taken
as "the supreme law of the land" and given real content. As was
pointed out previously, the exclusionary rule is the only really ef-
fective device available to give these constitutional provisions real
content.
THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION.
From the very nature of the subject matter, it can be seen that
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to amass any statistical data
on the frequency of illegal searches and seizures, but nevertheless,
there is abundant testimonial evidence of frequent abuse in "admis-
sionist" states.47 In New York, Judge Frank Oliver has recently
said that, "The police do not bother about getting warrants. They
all know the rules of evidence, so laugh at the constitution .... ,,48
In an effort to determine what the actual situation is in Ohio,
a study was attempted similar to that mentioned in Justice Mur-
phy's dissent in Wolf v. Colorado.49 Inquiries were directed to the
chiefs of police of the eight Ohio cities with population over 100,000
asking what instruction was given, both in recruit and in-service
4S Dissent in Wolf v. United States, supra note 9.
46 Antoszewski v. State 21 Ohio L. Abst. 345, 349; 31 NXE2d 881, 884 (C. P.
Cuyahoga Cty. 1936).
47 N.Y. Times, February 28, 1949; Senator Dunning in 1 N.Y.S. Cous~rru-
TioNAL CoNvmssmo REVISED REcoRD 365 (1938); Conmmwus, op. cit. supra, note
22; LAssoN, THE FouRTH A=Nm=m-T 106 (1937); Judge Levine, supra in An-
toszewsld case.
48 People v. Reilly, 105 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1951).
4 9 Supra, note 9.
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classes, to police officers in regard to the law of search and seizure.
No reply was received from Dayton and Canton. It might be safely
assumed that these cities give little or no instruction to their of-
ficers on search and seizure other than to inform them that Ohio
adopts the position that illegality of procurement has no effect on
admissibility in court. It is easy to see how such instruction might
be omitted or ignored since there is no practical difference in Ohio
in whether the search is legal or illegal.
Toledo, Columbus, Akron, Cleveland, Cincinnati and Youngs-
town indicated that some attention was given to instruction on
search and seizure. In Toledo, recruit police officers are given a
minimum of four months training and subsequent annual in-serv-
ice training. In the Toledo recruit training program, a total of 625
hours of instruction are given in all fields of which only 4 hours are
devoted to the law of search and seizure. In Cleveland, recruits are
given a 13 week course including 180 hours of Criminal Law. No
indication of how much time is devoted to search and seizure in
Cleveland, Columbus, Youngstown, Cincinnati, and Akron was giv-
en. Instruction in the training schools of the responding cities is
given by executive officers, prosecuting attorneys, or judges. The
Ohio General Code is the principal text used in the responding
cities although Columbus officers are also given a detailed pamphlet
on the law of arrest and search. The Ohio State reports are used in
some cities and Cincinnati noticed that the Lindway case "always
arouses great interest" in the classes.
Thus in Ohio, there is some instruction on the law of search
and seizure in most large cities, but it is not emphasized to any real
degree. It may be inferred from these letters that other subjects
are given greater weight. It is submitted that the importance of
the law of search and seizure in police training programs would be
greatly expanded if Ohio adopted the exclusionary rule.
In contrast to the situation in Ohio, Justice Murphy found that
generally states following the federal rule gave their officers ex-
tensive training in the rules of search and seizure. ie found that
in some of these "exclusionist" states, officers were informed of
current court decisions, special volumes on search and seizure were
used as a basis for extended instruction and there was heavy em-
phasis on the subject. The Justice said, "The contrast between
states with the federal rule and those without it is thus a positive
demonstration of its efficacy."
CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RiUL iN OHIo.
At present, a committee of the Ohio Bar Association is consider-
ing a recommendation to the legislature that the exclusionary rule
be adopted by statute. A straight-forward adoption of the federal
rule in Ohio would not mean that all evidence obtained by illegal
1953]
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search and seizure would not be admitted in evidence since there
are several limitations on the federal rule.50 The basis for these
limitations on the rule seems to be best explained on the "counter-
claim in tort" theory rather than on a principle of constitutional
right or on -a policy basis.5 ' If the federal rule was adopted in Ohio,
these limitations would probably apply. Evidence unlawfully ob-
tained by federal agents or private parties would not be within the
rule and would be admissible5 2 provided there was no collusion
with state officials 3 and a state official did not participate.54 A
motion to suppress such evidence would be necessary before trial or
there would be waiver of the right to exclusion ss unless the de-
fendant was not aware of the existence of the evidence or its sei-
zure.S6 The accused must have some proprietary interest in the
premises searched or the objects seized to provide standing to ob-
ject to the admission of the evidence.S7 Evidence obtained by actual
consent would be admissible, but the reality of this consent is usual-
ly difficult to establish.58 Whether Ohio would adopt all of these
limitations upon the exclusionary rule would depend on how com-
plete a protection was desired. Certainly several of the limitations
resemble those incident to a tort counterclaim and do not seem ap-
propriate to enforcement of a constitutional right.
50 But not all of the states adopting the exclusionary rule have adopted
all of the limitations placed thereon by federal courts. See 134 A.L.R. 820, 88
A.L.R. 348, 52 A.L.R. 477, 41 A.L.R. 1145, 32 A.L.R. 408, 24 A.L.R. 1408.
51 See 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948) where commentator argues that most
of the limitations should be removed since exclusion should be a constitutional
right.52 The following federal cases apply this limitation when the evidence is
unlawfully obtained by state officials or third parties: Burdeau v McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1926); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1926).
53 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) applies this restriction on
the limitation in federal courts.
5 4 In federal courts, as long as the federal agent was in the search before
the object was completely accomplished, he participated and the evidence
must be suppressed. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1948).
55 Weeks v. United States, supra note 6, applies this limitation in federal
courts.
56 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1945) applies this restriction on
the limitation in federal courts.
5 7 Evidence admissible in federal court when taken from apartment not
owned or inhabited by defendant even though he leased it along with co-
defendant, Ingram v. United States, 113 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1940); but cf. Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) where evidence taken from
apartment leased by accused held inadmissable. In federal court, there is a
proprietary interest in sealed matters in the mail. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727 (1877).
58 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920) is a comparable federal
case. State v. Lindway, supra note 13.
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In addition, the federal constitution does not protect against
seizure of all evidence. Evidence obtained by wiretapping has been
held admissible since intangible when there was no physical entry
on the premises of the accused 9 although a federal statute sub-
sequently made this procedure illegal 60 and such evidence is now
inadmissible.6 1 By analogy, it would seem that Ohio would need
a special statute in order to make such evidence inadmissible even
though the exclusionary rule was adopted. A seizure of public
property is not a violation of the constitution.6 2 Evidence obtained
as a result of a search incident to lawful arrest is admissible pro-
vided the officers do not go beyond the permissible area of search.6 3
The judicial conception of this area has not been constant. Objects
of evidentiary value only, are not properly seizable under a search
warrant but paradoxically are subject to seizure when uncovered
as a result of a search incident to a valid arrest.6 4
In absence of judicial action, it is the writer's opinion that a
statute should be passed by the legislature. A phraseology similar
to that adopted in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a
possibility.65 One objection to this sort of a statute is the possibility
of judicial nullification by an unsympathetic court through statutory
interpretation. A more specific statute might be drafted as follows:
Evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure
S9 Olmstead v United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
60 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946).
6 1 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
62 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1945).
63 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1945); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947); Tropiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1947); Rabinowitz
v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1949).
6 4 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920). Basis for this rule is
discussed in 20 CHL LYR=V. 319 (1953).
6 5 Rule 41 (e) of the FED. RuxEs OF Cmum. Psoc. provides "A person ag-
grieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for
the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property
and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that
(1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is
insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in
the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the existence
of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was il-
legally executed. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact nec-
essary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property
shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall
not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion to sup-
press evidence may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had.
The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity there-
for did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the mo-
tion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or
hearing."
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of the person or property of an accused will be suppressed
by the trial court provided:
1. Such search was conducted or participated in by a state
agent or agents, or conducted and participated in by
private parties in collusion with state agents, and
2. The accused makes timely motion to suppress before
trial. If the accused has no knowledge of the existence
of such evidence such a motion may be made at the time
of trial.
SUMAnY.
We have seen that it would be advisable for Ohio to adopt the
"exclusionai'y" rule prohibiting the introduction of evidence ob-
tained by unlawful search and seizure. Other remedies and deter-
rents are demonstrably inadequate. Our examination of policy con-
siderations and contentions of both groups indicated that the "ex-
clusionary" rule should be adopted. There is a need for adequate
protection of the right of privacy from unlawful searches and sei-
zures. Finally we have seen what would result from an adoption of
the "exclusionary" rule in Ohio and how it might be adopted.
John Marshall Adams
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